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National identities and the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the 2014 independence referendum in relation to national 
identities in Scotland. This is done firstly through reflecting on the referendum 
franchise and then by examining how people’s subjective national identities 
aligned with key political attitudes relevant to the constitutional question. Using 
survey data, this analysis compares longer term trends with data from the period 
immediately preceding the referendum vote, and suggests that the campaign 
may have given rise to a much closer ‘alignment’ between national identities and 
political attitudes. The concluding discussion suggests that national identities in 
Scotland may be understood as a series of only partially overlapping and shifting 
constituencies, based on subjective national belonging, residence, political 
enfranchisement, political-constitutional attitudes, and people’s understanding 
of and sense of affinity with a (British) social union, and that this concept of 
‘social union’ would  benefit from further sociological investigation. 
Keywords 
Scotland; national identities; referendum; surveys; political attitudes; social 
union 
 
Introduction 
On the 18th of September 2014 a referendum took place to determine whether 
Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom or become independent and 
end a political union that had endured for more than 300 years. This was not the 
first referendum to decide Scotland’s constitutional future. In 1979 a proposed 
Assembly to give Scotland more formal political autonomy within the UK failed 
to achieve the necessary support from the electorate. In 1997 a similar initiative 
for a ‘Parliament’ with more substantial autonomy than the proposed 1979 
Assembly easily achieved the required popular mandate, and the new Parliament 
opened in 1999. But the 2014 referendum was unprecedented in the UK in that it 
concerned the complete political secession of one of its constituent nations. It 
was also a rare example, even at a global level, of a democratic popular vote to 
determine the possible secession of part of an existing state to form a new 
independent state.  
The referendum campaign, the vote itself and its aftermath stimulated a huge 
amount of debate and coverage, and this has been re-enlivened by the result of 
the 2015 UK General Election in Scotland, with the Scottish National Party 
winning 56 of 59 seats. Although, not surprisingly, much of the discussion of the 
referendum and its aftermath has been focused on the political dimensions, a 
number of sociological perspectives were offered both prior to and after the 
vote. For example, prospectively, Bechoffer and McCrone (2014) discussed the 
status of British identity in the run up to the referendum, while Rosie (2014a) 
examined claims about referendum voting intentions and the potential impact of 
independence on religious groups in Scotland. Retrospectively, the British 
Sociological Association’s Discover Society offered a rapid response to the 
referendum outcome in several contributions concerning issues such as 
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democratic engagement and the future of nationalism in Scotland (Rosie 2014b) 
and the significance of gender in the campaign and vote (Rummery 2014).  
This paper has a different aim: to address the ways in which the referendum may 
be understood through reference to national identities and belonging. I do this 
firstly by reflecting briefly on who was (and was not) allowed to vote. The 
determination of the referendum franchise was not merely a matter of practical 
necessity: to some extent it reflects a disjuncture between political and 
sociological perspectives (and evidence) regarding the nature of national 
belonging in Scotland. I then develop this examination of the sociological and the 
political dimensions of nationhood by bringing together recent and historical 
survey data on people’s subjective national identities and political attitudes. This 
analysis generates some unprecedented findings, suggesting the potential for 
more highly politicised national identities in Scotland. I then conclude by 
reflecting on how the concept of ‘social union’, which so far has been only quite 
weakly articulated by politicians and seldom explicitly researched by social 
scientists, might help us make sense of some of these findings. 
 
National Belonging and the Referendum Franchise in Scotland 
Renan famously described the very existence of a nation as ‘an everyday 
plebiscite’ (1994 [1882]: 17), but in a less figurative and more literal sense an 
actual plebiscite in which the people of a nation vote both reflects the existence 
of that nation and something of its nature. Tierney states that ‘… the 
constitutional referendum by definition implicates an anterior act of demotic 
border-drawing — the framing of the collective self who will perform an act of 
constitutional self-determination and in doing so explicitly articulate itself as a 
constitutional people’ (2012: 58-9). While entitlement to vote is inevitably a 
factor in any election, in a referendum concerned with the very future of the 
state itself (or part thereof) the precise nature of ‘the people’ is potentially both a 
more vexed and sociologically interesting matter, which also takes on added 
complexity in contexts of sub-state nationalism such as that found in Scotland, 
where state and national demos obviously differ. Tierney observes that ‘… the 
constitutional referendum sets the boundary of the people by way of both 
territorial demarcation and franchise rules’ (ibid.: 59). Both these dimensions 
were observable in the case of the referendum on Scottish independence. The 
profound impact that a Yes vote would have had on the UK as a whole raised the 
question of whether ‘the people’ of the UK should all have an equal say through 
voting rights in the referendum, but this possibility was not ever seriously 
considered and the territorial demarcation of the people was based on the 
borders of Scotland, which are long settled and uncontroversial.  
Potentially more controversial was the second dimension concerning the nature 
of the franchise within these borders. As Tierney (2012: 59-60) observes of 
constitutional referendums more generally, the two most problematic questions 
tend to be: ‘are there or should there be people among those resident within the 
territory not entitled to vote? And, are there people resident beyond the territory 
to whom, nonetheless, the franchise is warranted?’. These are also rather more 
sociologically relevant and interesting questions because they go to the heart of 
how national ‘belonging’ or ‘membership’ may be determined or defined1. 
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While a wealth of sociological evidence on popular opinion about the key 
‘markers’ of Scottishness (those personal characteristics that people consider 
most important in determining who may belong to the nation) indicates that 
birthplace is clearly the most important factor (Bond 2006; Kiely et al. 2001; 
Kiely et al. 2005a; McCrone & Bechhofer 2008), this was not reflected in the 
franchise for the 2014 referendum in Scotland. Those entitled to vote were 
essentially the same as for local government and Scottish parliamentary 
elections, and indeed for the 1997 referendum on devolution. An important 
exception was that 16 and 17 year olds were included, which was itself an 
unprecedented feature for any kind of major political vote in a UK context. All UK 
citizens normally resident in Scotland were entitled to vote, but so too were 
citizens of other EU member states and ‘qualifying citizens’ of Commonwealth 
countries2.  
So, although a large majority of those who could vote were born in Scotland, for 
the purposes of the referendum franchise the key marker of Scottish national 
identity – birthplace – was effectively irrelevant, as those resident in Scotland 
but born in other parts of the UK, EU and Commonwealth had an equal say in 
determining Scotland’s constitutional future3. This principle extended to those 
born in Scotland but living in other parts of the UK: in England alone there are 
approximately 700,000 Scottish-born residents (Office for National Statistics 
2011) who were unable to vote in the referendum, as were Scottish-born people 
living in other parts of the world and those not born in Scotland who might 
nevertheless consider themselves Scottish on the basis of parentage or more 
distant ancestry. For example, in the USA in 2009 nearly 6 million people 
reported having Scottish ancestry (US Census Bureau 2012)4 and in Canada in 
2006 nearly 5 million (4,719,850) did so (Statistics Canada 2006)5. In Australia, 
the 2006 Census reports 1.5 million people claiming Scottish ancestry (see 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001cc5
88/5a47791aa683b719ca257306000d536c!OpenDocument). Although the 
exclusion in particular of the many Scottish-born people living in England did 
generate a degree of grievance, there was no serious and concerted political 
agenda on the part of any of the interested parties to extend the franchise 
beyond Scotland in any way. Although not extended to all (i.e. non-EU, non-
Commonwealth citizens), the application of the marker of residence to 
determine the franchise was therefore relatively uncontroversial, despite 
research evidence indicating that this is popularly considered to be a relatively 
weak marker that may be put forward as the basis for a Scottish identity. 
Claiming to ‘belong’ to Scotland based largely on residing in Scotland – even 
when that residence might be enduring and coupled with a firm commitment to 
remain in Scotland – is often seen as difficult both by migrants themselves and 
those who are born in Scotland (Bond 2006; Kiely et al. 2001; Kiely et al. 2005a; 
McCrone & Bechhofer 2008; McCrone & Bechhofer 2010). 
Undoubtedly, this approach was to a considerable extent pragmatic. It made the 
determination of eligibility relatively straightforward in ruling out people who 
would have been more difficult to evaluate (e.g. proving Scottish birthplace 
and/or ancestry); it meant that the electorate to be addressed by both campaigns 
(supporting and opposing independence) was fairly clear and territorially-
focused; and it was based on the established precedent of other elections in 
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Scotland (excluding UK-wide Westminster elections) and the 1997 referendum. 
But the referendum franchise might also be viewed as having wider sociological 
significance. As Tierney (2012: 60) argues, ‘the way in which the franchise issue 
is dealt with in the design of a referendum can tell us much about the type of 
nationalist ideology dominant in a specific state or territory; for example, 
particular rules of inclusion or exclusion reveal whether the vision of the nation 
that prevails is more or less ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ in orientation’. To an extent, then, 
the franchise for the referendum on Scottish independence reflects a conception 
of nationalism in Scotland as largely liberal rather than essentialist and exclusive 
(see e.g. Hearn 2014).  
However, it is important to recognise that the simple distinction between civic 
and ethnic nationalism has been widely critiqued (see e.g. Brown 1999; 
Brubaker 2004; Yack 1999). This has entailed a questioning of whether such 
ideal types may be straightforwardly applied to specific cases, and the extent to 
which it is legitimate to describe civic nationalism as fundamentally liberal and 
inclusive and ethnic nationalism as illiberal and exclusive. While the referendum 
franchise certainly accorded with an elite consensus in Scotland that views 
Scottishness as largely inclusive and open and encourages ‘new Scots’ who may 
claim this identity on the basis of neither birthplace nor ancestry, this begs the 
question of what it is that such people would be identifying with. As Brubaker 
(2004: 138) observes, even putative examples of civic nationalism such as that 
found in Scotland are based on certain characteristics (common values, 
practices, histories) that one might associate with more ethnocultural 
conceptions of nationalism (see also Yack 1999: 106-7). Further, not only might 
voluntaristic national identification come with certain conditions attached, this 
voluntarism is itself limited by wider factors: even the acquisition of Scottish 
residency is clearly not equally available to all peoples of the world. Finally, it is 
not necessarily the case that elite perspectives accord with popular conceptions 
of nationhood in Scotland, which may be rather more exclusive (Bond 2006).  
 
National Identities and the Referendum Vote 
If the referendum franchise might to some extent be understood sociologically in 
relation to questions about national identity, then so too can the referendum 
vote. In this paper I do not consider direct evidence concerning people’s reports 
of how they actually voted, partly because such data are not widely available at 
the time of writing. But I do consider a substantial and well-established body of 
evidence, directly comparable over a considerable time period, which concerns 
the perspectives of the people of Scotland on the constitutional question and 
related political issues. Importantly, I compare this evidence to similar data 
collected in the period immediately before the referendum (May-August 2014), 
which suggests some unusual, interesting and potentially important 
developments. In particular I relate political perspectives to people’s own 
subjectively expressed national identities. Because at its heart the referendum 
debate concerned whether and in what ways Scotland should remain part of 
Britain, I use an established measure of subjective identity that explicitly invites 
people in Scotland to express the relative priority of Scottish and British 
identities. This is the so-called ‘Moreno’ question6 based on a 5-point scale with 
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the following options: Scottish not British; More Scottish than British; Equally 
Scottish and British; More British than Scottish; and British not Scottish. 
There is a well-established body of research examining how subjective identities 
on this scale may be associated with key political variables, most prominently 
constitutional preference (essentially, independence, devolution, or no Scottish 
Parliament) and which political party people identify with most closely (see e.g. 
Bond 2000; Bond & Rosie 2002; Bond 2009; Bond & Rosie 2010; Rosie & Bond 
2003). Although such associations in Scotland have sometimes been described as 
‘weak’ (see e.g. McCrone & Bechhofer 2008: 1263), this is probably overstating 
the case somewhat given that there are clear associations to the extent that 
people who identify as exclusively Scottish or at least prioritise Scottishness are 
much more likely to support independence and/or the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) than are people who feel themselves to be equally Scottish and British, or 
have a prioritised or exclusive British identity. But, as we will see, it is also 
certainly true that there has indeed been a clear ‘non-alignment’ (Bond 2000) 
between subjective national identities and these key political variables. As Hearn 
states ‘… in the Scottish context, correlations between national identity, party 
support, and constitutional preferences are loose and shifting’ (2014: 507). 
But re-assessing these correlations using evidence from the referendum period 
generates some interesting results. It suggests not merely a continuation of 
established patterns, but that either the referendum may have brought about a 
particular, although perhaps temporary, set of conditions in which subjective 
national identities became much more closely ‘aligned’ with key political 
perspectives, or alternatively that it may have instigated a more enduring 
alignment between identities and political positions. 
As a useful starting point in the analysis, table 1 shows trends in national 
identities using the 5-point Scottish-British ‘Moreno’ scale over a period of more 
than 20 years. These trend data are somewhat counterintuitive given what we 
might expect about the effect of a newly established and prominent political 
institution on subjective identities. Specifically, rather than a shift towards more 
strongly prioritised Scottish as opposed to British identity following the re-
establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the evidence suggests the opposite. 
This is most noticeable in the trend decline of those in the Scottish not British 
and More Scottish than British categories, from a high point of more than 2/3 in 
the year that the Scottish Parliament was re-established (1999), to a (narrow) 
minority in the year of the independence referendum. A further point to note 
about the data from 2014 is that this marks the first time that the equally 
balanced dual identity was the modal category7, and indeed the only instance 
shown, with the exception of 2001, where the More Scottish category is not the 
most popular. Hence there is no evidence here to suggest a decline in people’s 
self-identification as British as the Scottish Parliament has become established, 
developed and taken on new powers. This is particularly notable given that, 
since 2007, the parliament has been led by a governing party (the SNP) whose 
raison detre is the dissolution of the (British) political Union, and which is 
currently enjoying unprecedented success in electoral performance and 
recruitment of new members. This immediately suggests that there is no simple 
correspondence between people’s subjective identification as Scottish and/or 
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British and political behaviour, attitudes and structures in Scotland: national 
identities are socially as well as politically shaped. 
We should also note that in some respects national identities in Scotland have 
not changed so much over recent history – most notably the proportion 
prioritising Britishness, although it has increased very marginally in recent 
years, remains a very small minority when compared to those who prioritise 
Scottish identity or indeed see themselves as exclusively Scottish. 
 
Table 1: Trends in subjective national identities in Scotland, 1992-2014 
 1992 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
 % % % % % % % % % % % % 
SnB 19 23 32 36 31 32 27 27 28 23 25 24 
S>B 40 38 35 30 34 32 30 31 30 30 29 25 
S=B 33 27 22 24 22 22 28 26 26 30 29 32 
B>S 3 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 6 4 5 
BnS 3 4 4 3 4 5 6 4 4 6 6 6 
Oth 1 2 4 4 5 5 6 8 8 6 7 9 
N 957 882 1482 1605 1508 1549 1508 1482 1495 1229 1497 1501 
Sources:  Data from 1999-2014 are from the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys (ScotCen Social 
Research 2014); data from 1992 and 1997 are from Scottish Election Surveys (see Bond & Rosie 
2002).  All data excluding sample sizes have been weighted. All percentages have been rounded 
to the nearest whole %. 
Key: SnB (Scottish not British); S>B (More Scottish than British); S=B (Equally Scottish and 
British); B>S (More British than Scottish); BnS (British not Scottish); Oth (Other, None or Don’t 
Know). 
We now turn to the question of the ‘alignment’ of these expressed identities with 
the key political variables of constitutional preference and party identification. 
We initially focus only on how support for independence relates to national 
identities, shown in Table 2. In this and the remaining tables below, only selected 
years are shown from all the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys over the period. 
For tables 2 and 4 I have simply presented data at five year intervals for the 
decade immediately following the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
1999, and increased the frequency to two year intervals for 2010-2014. These 
data give a general sense of the associations shown in the tables and their 
development over time. Although there are inevitably some fluctuations in the 
data not included, no obvious ‘outlier’ years have been omitted. The aim is to 
give a reasonably faithful  representation of the data over the period while being 
parsimonious in order to maintain clarity and avoid the presentation of an 
excessive amount of information. 
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Table 2: % of each national identity category supporting Independence, 
selected years 2000-2014  
% 2000 2005 2010 2012 2014 
Scottish  not British 48 58 46 49 68 
More Scottish than British 28 36 25 25 49 
Equally Scottish and British 15 21 10 12 12 
More British/British not Scottish 8 20 7 8 15 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys. All data excluding sample sizes have been weighted. All 
percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole %. The More British than Scottish and 
British not Scottish categories have been combined and all those not answering or who 
responded ‘don’t know’ to the question on constitutional preference have been excluded.  
Overall, Table 2 shows a clear association between subjective national identity 
and support for independence. In each year those who describe themselves as 
exclusively Scottish are clearly the most likely to support independence and 
those who describe their identity as more Scottish than British are in turn much 
more likely to support independence than are those who do not prioritise their 
Scottishness. In all years but one those with an equal dual identity are more 
supportive of independence than those who prioritise their Britishness, but the 
differences between these groups are much less marked. 
However, there is also clear evidence to suggest that, especially in the period 
before 2014, the association between identities and support for independence is 
not especially strong. Although there is evident fluctuation in the data, only 
around half of those who describe themselves as exclusively Scottish support 
independence (this is also true of other years not shown in the table). We can 
also see that clear minorities – approximately between one-quarter and one-
third – of those in the More Scottish category also support independence. These 
data do not suggest that a prioritised Scottish identity is necessarily politicised, 
at least with regard to a desired correspondence between subjective national 
belonging and political representation in the form of independent statehood. 
This further substantiates the earlier point made in relation to Table 1: key 
political-constitutional attitudes do not map on neatly to subjective national 
identities in Scotland, suggesting the latter have an important social dimension. 
Equally, Table 2 shows that support for independence among those who see 
their Britishness as equally or more important than Scottishness, or indeed do 
not see themselves as Scottish at all, is perhaps higher than we might anticipate. 
Typically, small but far from trivial minorities in these identity categories 
express support for an independent Scotland and we must assume that this 
support is largely based on factors other than their self-conceived sense of 
national belonging. 
Despite an obvious pattern of association, then, ‘non-alignment’ is also clearly 
evident in the pre-referendum period. On the one hand, we might say that it is 
somewhat counterintuitive that so many who profess to feel no sense of 
Britishness at all seem content to continue with a system of government in which 
the British dimension seems paramount. But on the other hand we might say 
that at least a partial explanation for this lies with the existence of a devolved 
Scottish Parliament within the broader context of the UK state: a strongly 
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prioritised Scottish as opposed to British identity might be represented 
politically by a level of national autonomy short of full statehood. This is 
explored in Table 3 below, which presents a fuller analysis of the association 
between national identities and constitutional preferences. In the interests of 
economy and space, only two years are shown: 2014 and 2012. This highlights a 
contrast (which will be discussed further below) between the period 
immediately before the referendum (2014) and the earlier period represented 
by 2012. Although not shown in the table, the figures for 2000 and 2010 are 
much more similar to 2012 than they are to 2014. This is not true to the same 
extent for 2005, mainly because support for independence overall was higher in 
that survey than in the others years pre-2014, but, as already shown in Table 2, 
this support among the Scottish not British group was still substantially lower 
than in 2014. 
 
Table 3: Preference for the future government of Scotland by national 
identity category, 2014 and 2012  
 
 Independence Devolution No Scottish 
Parliament 
N 
2014      
Scottish  not British % 68 28 4 311 
More Scottish than British % 49 46 6 357 
Equally Scottish and British % 12 77 11 420 
More British/British not Scottish % 15 70 14 167 
2012      
Scottish  not British % 49 42 9 256 
More Scottish than British % 25 68 7 349 
Equally Scottish and British % 12 75 13 357 
More British/British not Scottish % 8 68 24 153 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys. All data excluding sample sizes have been weighted. All 
percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole %. The More British than Scottish and 
British not Scottish categories have been combined and all those not answering or who 
responded ‘don’t know’ to the question on constitutional preference have been excluded. 
Pre-2014 trends in support for a devolved Scottish Parliament by national 
identity to some extent indicate a degree of consensus as opposed to ‘alignment’. 
This is consistently the most popular option among all groups who express any 
sense of Britishness at all, but large minorities (ranging from about one-third to 
just less than half) of the exclusively Scottish group also typically prefer the 
current devolved settlement to full independence. In fact as recently as 2010 
devolution was actually more popular among those expressing a Scottish not 
British identity than was independence.  
However, as we now know, when constitutional preferences were formally put 
to the test in the 2014 referendum, the outcome, although rejecting 
independence, did not reflect a consensus around devolution to the extent that 
the pre-2014 survey data might suggest, with 45% voting for independence. An 
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explanation for this may be found if we focus on support for independence by 
national identity in 2014, shown in both tables 2 and 3. Although these data were 
collected before the referendum, during the period of the fieldwork the 
campaign was already intense and the vote itself less than four months away. 
These data show a much stronger alignment between identities and support for 
independence compared to previous years, at least if we focus on the Scottish not 
British and More Scottish categories of respondent. Support for independence 
accounted for more than two-thirds of the exclusively Scottish group compared 
to typically less than half in previous years and there was a 40 percentage point 
difference between support for independence and devolution in the Scottish not 
British group in 2014, which was quite unprecedented. Even in the 2005 survey, 
when, as noted above, support for independence across all national identity 
categories was relatively high, this percentage point difference was only 24, and 
more commonly in the pre-2014 surveys levels of support for independence and 
devolution are quite similar among the Scottish not British group. Further, 
among the More Scottish than British respondents support for independence in 
2014 increased from a figure typically between one-quarter and one-third to 
nearly half of such people. In the context of the wealth of trend data on ‘(non-) 
alignment’ that we have from previous years these findings are clearly 
anomalous and interesting. It seems that in the context of the referendum 
campaign more people’s identities were politicised to the extent that there 
developed a much stronger association between prioritised Scottishness and 
support for independence in particular. 
Before we seek to explore this phenomenon further by attempting to establish 
any other possible evidence of closer alignment between subjective national 
identities and political attitudes, it is however important to add two 
qualifications. First, there is no evidence of such alignment among those at the 
opposite, most British end of the identity scale. If stronger alignment were taking 
place at all points along this scale, we would expect that only a tiny minority of 
the most strongly British identifiers would support independence, but in fact the 
proportion doing so in 2014 was the highest since 2005. Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, until we gather similar data from subsequent years we cannot 
establish whether such alignment as does appear to have taken place was solely 
related to the context of the referendum campaign itself, or whether the 
referendum and its aftermath will indeed mark the beginning of a new trend in 
which prioritised Scottish identity in particular is much more likely to be 
politicised with respect to a desire that this identity is reflected in full 
independent statehood.  
Alongside views on Scotland’s constitutional status, we can also examine how 
identities relate to individual political perspectives by examining data on party 
identification. This is preferred to analysing people’s voting behaviour (recalled 
or intended) because it avoids the possible distortions of tactical voting and 
instead assesses which, if any, political party people identify with most strongly 
in a general sense. In Scotland, the extent to which we can say that any party is 
necessarily ‘more Scottish’ than others in any kind of essential way is a complex 
matter. A particular dimension of politics in Scotland is that all the major parties 
describe themselves as ‘Scottish’ and, as Hearn (2014: 508) points out, ‘… in 
Scotland, normal politics is not a struggle between nationalism (represented by 
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the SNP) and something else; it is between contending nationalisms’. However, 
we may speak of ‘alignment’ in the sense of how these parties might be 
associated with different constitutional perspectives. Here we focus only on 
those four parties that have consistently attracted the highest levels of support in 
Scotland over the period for which data are analysed, i.e. the SNP, Labour, Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives, although an interesting development in more 
recent political history has been the explicit support for independence voiced by 
some of the smaller parties, most obviously the Greens and various socialist 
parties. 
Given their name and political raison detre, we would expect that if identities and 
political preferences are indeed aligned, then a large majority of SNP supporters 
would view themselves as exclusively Scottish or at the very least more Scottish 
than British. Labour and the Liberal Democrats are part of wider UK party 
structures and neither supports independence. Alongside the Conservatives, 
they campaigned (under ‘Better Together’) against Scottish independence in the 
referendum, but both had key roles in the Constitutional Convention that laid the 
groundwork for Scottish devolution in the 1990s and it was the (UK) Labour 
party that passed legislation for the 1997 referendum leading to the re-
establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. These are therefore parties 
among whose supporters we might expect dual Scottish/British identities to 
feature particularly strongly. Finally, the Conservatives have now endured a long 
period of comparative political failure in Scotland, and this failure is regarded by 
some as at least partly attributable to popular perceptions that they are 
essentially an ‘English’ party – i.e. related to a perceived lack of ‘Scottishness’ 
(Bednarek 2011; Hopkin & Bradbury 2006; McCrone 2001: 114). They are also, 
most obviously among all the parties, the most strongly associated with the 
political Union of Britain: in Scotland their official name is the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party, and this strong unionism was reflected in their 
consistent opposition to devolution before the 1997 referendum. Overall then, if 
national identities and party political identification are aligned then we would 
expect Conservatives to have the most British subjective national identities. 
Table 4 shows trends of the national identities of those who identify with each of 
the four main parties, using the same years and identity categories as were 
examined with regard to support for independence in Table 2. The data exhibit 
some similarities to the relationship between identities and constitutional 
preference in that: a) there is a clear association and the nature of that 
association is broadly as we would expect; b) there is also considerable evidence 
of ‘non-alignment’; c) the most recent 2014 data from the referendum period 
shows some interesting differences to established trends. Points a) and b) have 
been well-established in previous research (Bond 2000; Bond & Rosie 2002; 
Bond 2009; Bond & Rosie 2010; Rosie & Bond 2003), and the table shows the 
consistency of these patterns over time, albeit with some fluctuations.  
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Table 4: National identities of those who identify with each major political 
party, selected years 2000-2014  
 2000 2005 2010 2012 2014 
SNP      
 % % % % % 
Scottish not British 53 51 47 34 43 
More Scottish than British 31 37 38 40 36 
Equally Scottish and British 11 9 10 18 13 
More British/British not Scottish 2 3 2 3 3 
N 319 195 256 290 363 
Labour      
 % % % % % 
Scottish not British 38 32 28 19 19 
More Scottish than British 33 35 33 35 29 
Equally Scottish and British 19 24 26 33 39 
More British/British not Scottish 6 7 7 11 9 
N 621 534 485 403 443 
Liberal Democrat      
 % % % % % 
Scottish not British 20 22 15 10 14 
More Scottish than British 43 34 26 28 16 
Equally Scottish and British 16 22 33 25 55 
More British/British not Scottish 10 13 16 25 11 
N 121 214 185 70 70 
Conservative      
 % % % % % 
Scottish not British 25 21 16 7 4 
More Scottish than British 24 29 24 22 12 
Equally Scottish and British 33 26 42 45 52 
More British/British not Scottish 16 19 15 23 27 
N 269 245 215 152 191 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys. All data excluding sample sizes have been weighted. All 
percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole %. The More British than Scottish and 
British not Scottish categories have been combined. Those who professed another national 
identity or none are not represented in the table, hence percentages do not sum to 100. 
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Taking SNP identifiers first, the data are broadly as we would expect to the 
extent that very few prioritise a British over a Scottish identity and typically 
quite small minorities express an equal dual identity. A Scottish only identity is 
also the most common among this group in all surveys but one. However, there is 
evidence of non-alignment between national and party identification in that in all 
but one survey a majority of SNP identifiers see themselves as British to some 
extent. With regard to whether the 2014 data represent a departure from 
established trends for SNP identifiers, this does not appear to be true because 
the distribution of identities seems to be fairly typical. Although there was not 
much scope for SNP identifiers to become ‘less British’, we might have expected 
that if national and party political identification did become more aligned in the 
context of the referendum, then a much larger proportion of SNP identifiers 
would express exclusively Scottish national identities, but this is not the case. 
With regard to Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers, as expected dual 
identities are very prominent and it is difficult to speak of any ‘non-alignment’ 
here given that we would not have anticipated that identifiers with these parties 
would cluster towards either extreme of the Scottish-British scale. Patterns of 
national identity among these groups largely reflect those for people in Scotland 
as a whole, in that while dual identities are expressed by a large majority, it is 
clear that Scottish rather than British identity is most likely to be prioritised. But 
unlike SNP identifiers there is some evidence for these two parties that 2014 was 
different to previous surveys. This is most evident in the low proportions 
prioritising their Scottishness and high proportions expressing an equal dual 
identity compared to previous surveys. Among Labour identifiers, 2014 is the 
only year shown where only a minority (albeit nearly half) prioritised their 
Scottishness, and the only instance where an equal dual identity was the most 
commonly expressed. A similar phenomenon is observable among Liberal 
Democrat identifiers: in 2014 a much lower proportion than in previous surveys 
prioritised a Scottish identity and a (much) higher proportion saw themselves as 
equally Scottish and British. Although the data might also indicate that these 
patterns are a continuation of pre-established trends9, nevertheless the extent of 
Britishness among those who identify most closely with these parties was 
especially marked in 2014. Therefore it is possible that the context of the 
referendum encouraged the expression of an equal Scottish-British identity 
among supporters of these two parties, both of which stressed the benefits of the 
Union (‘better together’) during the referendum campaign. 
Turning finally to Conservative identifiers, they perhaps provide the most 
interesting illustration of a shift from non-alignment to alignment with national 
identities. In earlier surveys in particular, the profile of Conservative supporters 
is rather more Scottish than we might expect – not markedly different from 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats and with those prioritising Scottish identity 
clearly outweighing those prioritising Britishness. Although more recent surveys 
tend to show a trend decline in the proportion prioritising Scottishness among 
this group, the data for 2014 are particularly marked in this respect with only a 
small minority prioritising Scottishness, to the extent that this is the only survey 
in which Conservative supporters have a more British than Scottish profile. It is 
also the only survey in the table in which a majority of Conservative identifiers 
have an equal dual identity. This pattern is more in line with what we might 
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expect given the nature of the Conservative party in Scotland and the UK, but it 
does not reflect previous data and trends: this appears to be another example 
where the specific context of the referendum has encouraged an alignment of 
political attitudes and national identities. 
This alignment might be assessed further by bringing together both dimensions 
of the political attitudes that have been examined (constitutional preference and 
party identification) and examining how these articulate with national identities. 
This approach has again been employed in previous research (Bond 2000; Bond 
& Rosie 2002; Rosie & Bond 2003). Focusing only on those who express an 
exclusive or prioritised Scottish identity in relation to Britishness – i.e. those who 
describe themselves as Scottish not British or More British than Scottish – we 
can examine the proportions who a) both support Scottish independence and 
identify with the SNP; or b) support neither Scottish independence nor identify 
with the SNP.  
The findings substantiate our earlier evidence concerning the unprecedented 
extent of alignment between national identities and key political variables in the 
context of the 2014 independence referendum. Among those who see themselves 
as exclusively Scottish, in the surveys prior to 2014 only quite small minorities 
(typically between one-fifth and one-quarter) both supported independence and 
identified with the SNP. At the same time, pre-2014, typically not much less than 
half the respondents in the Scottish not British group in fact adopted neither of 
these political positions. The pattern in 2014 presented a clear contrast to 
previous data, in that for nearly half of this group their exclusively Scottish 
national identity was fully ‘aligned’ with both ‘nationalist’ political positions, and 
only a quarter of this group adopted neither of these positions. Among the More 
Scottish than British group, not surprisingly the extent of non-alignment we 
observed among the exclusively Scottish respondents is even more marked in 
the surveys before 2014: typically only 10-15% support both independence and 
the SNP, and a clear majority (usually around 60%) support neither. But again 
alignment is markedly closer in 2014: the proportion aligned with both political 
positions increased to nearly a third. and only a minority (42%) supported 
neither independence nor identified with the SNP. 
Of course, even in 2014, these data still do not suggest a very strong association 
between exclusive and prioritised Scottish national identities and politically 
nationalist attitudes. This is most obvious with regard to the Scottish not British 
group, for whom a sizeable minority continue to disassociate themselves from 
what we would expect to be the most obvious political manifestations of this 
identity. But the data do confirm that the referendum may have led either to an 
unusually close but perhaps temporary alignment of national identities and 
political opinion, or maybe the beginning of a period of closer alignment. 
Thus, although we have observed that national identities in Scotland (Scottish 
and/or British) need to be thought of as social as well as political phenomena, it 
is possible that these identities are more politicised than ever before in the 
contemporary context, or at least that there is the potential for them to become 
more politicised when key decisions are at stake regarding Scotland’s status as a 
‘stateless’ or ‘understated’ nation (McCrone 2005), or a formally independent 
state. As Hearn (2014: 511) observes, ‘nationalism […] is normal. It becomes 
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peculiarly visible when aligned with options of territorial secession, as in the 
Scottish case, with the possibility of separation between Scotland and the rest of 
the UK’. This is significant given the unexpectedly close outcome of the 
referendum vote and its political aftermath, with intense debate about the nature 
of Scotland’s autonomy and a huge surge in both electoral support for and 
membership of the key party for which the referendum result might have been a 
crushing defeat – the SNP. All these developments suggest that the debate about 
Scotland’s political future is likely to be active rather than dormant in the years 
ahead.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The argument and evidence in this paper highlights the complex relationship 
between national belonging in a social and political sense. Many of those who 
contributed to the decision on Scotland’s constitutional future in 2014 would not 
understand themselves as subjectively Scottish at all, and yet because of the 
nature of the referendum franchise, insofar as we may speak of ‘citizens’ of a 
nation that is not also an independent state, they were and continue to be, in 
Marshall’s (1950) terms, ‘political citizens’ of Scotland. Equally, the political 
rights given to those deemed to ‘belong’ on the basis of residence were not 
extended to include non-residents who might have felt a greater sense of 
national belonging on the basis of markers of national identity that most 
research has shown to be more salient in a Scottish context than is residence – 
namely, ancestry and (especially) birthplace (Bond 2006; Kiely et al. 2001; Kiely 
et al. 2005a; McCrone & Bechhofer 2008). This was especially evident for those 
born in Scotland (many of whom will also have been born of Scottish parents) 
but resident in other parts of Britain, who did not have the capacity to contribute 
to the determination of Scotland’s future in the 2014 referendum.  
Migration across national borders within the same (UK) state means that for 
many people in the UK, their national origins and subjective sense of national 
identity does not necessarily map on to the specific sub-state nation in which 
they reside. One consequence of this is the cross-border networks of family and 
friendship which represent one part of the broader concept of ‘social union’. This 
term appears to have been in political currency since at least the late 1990s (see 
Tickell 2012) and is most closely associated with the SNP. The party has used the 
concept as a means to emphasise that the end of political union that would be 
brought about by Scottish independence would be paralleled by the continuation 
of various other bonds and affinities between the different UK nations (see e.g. 
Salmond 2012). As well as family and friendship, the other most commonly cited 
dimensions of social union relate to shared history and language; economic 
trade; cross-border labour mobility; and shared cultural reference points (e.g. in 
television and sport) (see Salmond ibid.; Scottish Government 2013; Tickell 
ibid.)10. 
Although ‘social union’ has not been explicitly addressed by social scientists, it 
has been researched more implicitly to some extent with regard to the different 
dimensions of Britishness that it ostensibly entails, and how people’s subjective 
national identities relate to these dimensions. Many of these studies are based on 
qualitative evidence, especially drawn from in-depth interviews. For example, 
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Hopkins et al. (2006) and Bond et al. (2010) have explored how labour and 
educational mobility within Britain might be related to national identity. A large 
body of work by Bechhofer, Kiely, McCrone and colleagues (e.g. Kiely et al. 
2005b) and Condor, Abell and colleagues (e.g. Condor and Abell 2006) has 
examined people’s identification as British (and as Scottish or English), and the 
cited examples of their work show how elements of shared history inform 
people’s national identification (or indeed non-identification). It is notable that 
all this research has often shown the continuing significance of national borders 
within Britain and the different perspectives on national identity that are 
sometimes evident across these borders, as much (if not more) than highlighting 
what is shared within a ‘social union’. However, doubtless much social science 
has and continues to examine social and cultural phenomenon through an 
undifferentiated ‘British’ lens. This perspective sometimes also extends to a 
cultural studies approach that addresses some of the other purported aspects of 
a (British) social union (see e.g. chapters on film, television, music and sport in 
Morley and Robins (eds.) 2001). 
While the analysis in this paper has been based largely on quantitative evidence 
concerning the articulation of national identities and political attitudes in 
Scotland, such analysis has itself consistently suggested that identifying as 
Scottish and/or British cannot be simply a political matter, and this confirms that  
being British may be as much if not more concerned with shared cultural, social 
and economic reference points rather than legal citizenship and a shared 
political structure. While the concept of social union has similar connotations, 
suggesting various ways in which British identification and sentiment may exist 
and be sustained somewhat independently of more formal political alliances and 
arrangements, perhaps its contemporary significance lies in its more explicit 
articulation as part of debates about political-constitutional futures in a radically 
changed post-referendum political landscape in Scotland and Britain11. A further 
more novel and contemporary implication suggested by social union is that 
British and Scottish identities may continue to be complementary rather than 
competing, regardless of Scotland’s political future (see also McCrone and 
Bechhofer 2015: 186-7). Indeed it has been suggested that the SNP, while being 
the primary advocates of the dissolution of the political (British) union, might 
even be described as the most faithful representatives of the continuing social 
union12. 
These observations can go some way to help us better understand the ‘non-
alignment’ that continues to be evident between identities and attitudes to key 
political-constitutional questions in Scotland. Perhaps those who prioritise their 
Scottish over British identity do not also manifest the most obvious expressions 
of political Scottishness because of the extent to which they associate with the 
social union. Perhaps even those who state, in response to survey questions, that 
they do not feel nor would describe themselves as British still concede that they 
are British in some respects, whether they find this desirable or not. At the same 
time, a key finding in this paper is that it demonstrates recent evidence of closer 
‘alignment’, suggesting the potential for more politicised national identities in 
Scotland, which may or may not indicate a weakening in people’s attachment to 
social union.  
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A degree of caution is required in considering the extent to which these various 
factors might explain the results of the 2014 referendum and 2015 UK general 
election in Scotland. It seems likely that the willingness of a greater number of 
people who identified as exclusively or primarily Scottish to politicise these 
identities via support for an independent Scotland to some extent explains the 
higher than expected (prior to the campaign) Yes vote in the referendum. But at 
the same time at least some of these Yes voters might have envisaged a 
continuing identification with Britain regardless of the referendum outcome and 
there will have been some who identified as exclusively Scottish but who voted 
No for any number of reasons not related to national identity. Similarly, while 
closer alignment of identities and attitudes might go some way to explaining the 
SNP’s overwhelming success in the 2015 UK election, it is likely that this success 
owes much to how the party was evaluated (in relation to its policies, 
organisation and leadership) in comparison to its main political rival in Scotland, 
the Labour Party. In other words, for many a vote for the SNP would have been 
motivated by political-ideological factors rather than being an expression of 
national identity.  
Overall, national identities in Scotland, at least as they relate to political-
constitutional matters, may be understood as a series of only partially 
overlapping and shifting constituencies, based on subjective national belonging, 
residence, political enfranchisement, political-constitutional attitudes, and 
people’s understanding of and sense of affinity with a (British) social union. 
Although the outcome and aftermath of both the 2014 referendum in Scotland 
and the recent 2015 UK general election cannot be explained solely through 
reference to national identities, understanding these constituencies and how 
they interrelate is likely to be more important than ever for social scientists in 
this new and changing political context. Developing this understanding might 
also include further sociological investigation into the concept of social union, 
which has until now largely been only superficially articulated by politicians and 
has not been addressed explicitly and directly by social scientists. This would 
certainly involve research that goes beyond the employment of survey questions 
and includes a more qualitative, interactive dimension, building on the other 
related qualitative research outlined above. This would allow for the extent to 
which the concept of social union has resonance among the general public to be 
addressed more deeply and directly. To what extent do cross-border family and 
friendship networks, employment experiences (or aspirations) or particular 
cultural or sporting reference points contribute to a sense of Britishness and a 
sense of belonging to a shared social union? If these are important, then to what 
degree may they be separated from the key political attitudes that have been 
addressed in this paper, especially if these attitudes are indeed becoming more 
closely ‘aligned’ with people’s subjective national identities? Perhaps most 
pertinently, would a ‘social’ Britishness be likely to endure in any future 
independent Scotland (and for how long), or would the end of the political union 
effectively and eventually mean the end of Britain? 
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Notes 
1 Indeed, while taking a primarily legal perspective, Tierney himself recognises 
that one of the reasons that such issues are so legally complex is that they relate 
to identity markers and concepts that are sociological as well as legal in nature. 
2 ‘Qualifying citizens’ are those who have leave to remain in the UK or do not 
require such leave. In contrast to Scotland’s referendum, citizens of other EU 
states (excepting Ireland) are not permitted to vote in UK general elections (see 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/faq/voting-and-registration/who-is-
eligible-to-vote-at-a-uk-general-election). 
3 Based on 2011 Census data (www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk) nearly 10% of 
Scotland’s population were born in other parts of the UK and 3% in other EU 
countries (this does not include Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013). At the 
time of writing, detailed data on other Commonwealth citizens resident in 
Scotland were not available, but 2011 Census data indicates that around 1.2% of 
Scotland’s population were born in the Commonwealth countries of Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand and Pakistan alone. 
4 The exact estimate is 5,847,000. The same source also estimates 3,570,000 
people in the USA with ‘Scotch-Irish’ (as distinct from Irish) ancestry. 
5 This is an estimate based on a 20% sample of data. 
6 This term is commonly used by academic and other researchers. It reflects the 
fact that the question was first applied in a Scottish (and indeed UK) context by 
Luis Moreno (see e.g. Moreno 1988), although in fact a similar question had 
previously been used by other researchers in Spain (see e.g. Gunther et al. 1986). 
7 In both 2012 and 2013 the More Scottish than British category was marginally 
the modal category before rounding. 
8 It should be noted that there are only 70 cases in this group and hence the 
margin for error is much higher than for the other parties, particularly compared 
to SNP and Labour identifiers. But even with a much larger confidence interval 
the difference in the proportion with an equal dual identity compared to 
previous years is still significant. 
9 Indeed although not shown in the table, the data for 2013 broadly occupy a 
mid-point between the 2012 and 2014 figures for both parties. 
10 As well as social union, the former SNP leader and First Minister of Scotland, 
Alex Salmond, argued in the pre-referendum period that four other ‘unions’ 
would also endure following Scotland’s political independence: the union of the 
crowns (i.e. the monarchy), the currency union, the defence union (via NATO 
membership) and Scotland’s place in the European Union (Scottish Government 
2013). These claims – especially regarding  currency union and European Union 
– generated much controversy and debate in the referendum campaign. 
11 Indeed, some have expressed scepticism about the extent to which the social 
and political (unions) can be neatly divorced (see Tickell 2012). Moreover, some 
conceptions of social union also imply that it could accommodate some more 
formal institutional and political dimensions such as diplomatic cooperation and 
shared social policies (Mooney 2013; Tickell ibid.) 
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12 See Professor James Mitchell’s Donaldson Lecture to the SNP party conference 
in October 2011: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTUHHVlWQWY 
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